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Summary findings
Tsetsekos and Varangis examine the architecture,  Exchanges are regulated directly or indirectly
elements of market design, and products  traded in  through a government law. In addition, exchanges have
derivatives exchanges around the world. The core  their own regulatory structure.
function of a derivatives exchange is to facilitate the  * Typically (but not always) market-making systems
transfer of risk among economic agents by providing  are based on open outcry, with daily mark-to-market and
mechanisms to enhance liquidity and facilitate price  gross margining - but electronic systems are gaining
discovery. They test the proposition that organizational  popularity.
arrangements necessary to perform this function are not  * Several (but not all) exchanges own clearing
the same across markets. They also examine the  facilities and use netting settlement procedures.
sequencing of products introduced in derivatives  As for derivative products  traded, they find that
exchanges.  * Although most of the older exchanges started with
Using a survey instrument, they find that:  (mainly agricultural) commodity derivatives, newer
Financial systems perform the sarne core functions  exchanges first introduce financial derivative products.
across time and place but institutional arrangements  *  Derivatives based on a domestic stock index have
differ.  greater potential for success followed by derivatives
*  The ownership structure of derivatives exchanges  based on local interest rates and currencies.
assumes different forms across markets.  *  The introduction of derivatives contracts appears to
* The success of an exchange depends on the structure  take more time in emerging markets compared with
adopted and the products traded.  developed, with the exception of index products.
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Derivatives exchanges contribute to the development of the financial infrastructure
of a country by providing the links among cash markets, hedgers, and speculators.'  Along
with the global deregulation of finiancial  markets, derivatives exchanges have attracted the
attention  of both  academic literature and popular press.  Among others,  the  academic
literature has dealt with issues of valuation and pricing of derivative products  (Bensaid,
Lense, Pages,  and Scheinkman (1992), Bick (1982)); issues related to  the infonnation
content  of prices in derivative contracts (Damodaran and Subrahmanyam (1992), Scott
(1992)); the relationship between derivatives and cash markets (Ely (1991)),  Figlewski
(1987)); the pricing of complex instruments under different specifications of underlying
assets parameters (Hodges et al. (1992), Hull and White (1993), Lee (1994)); and issues
related to efficiencies of derivatives markets (Craig, Dravid, and Richardson (1995)). The
popular press has also  dealt with derivatives markets by reporting the risks caused  by
derivatives trading and the regulation of derivatives markets (Herz (1993), Jordan (1995)).
Attention  to  derivatives markets is justified on  the  enormous  levels of  global
trading for both exchange-traded products and over-the-counter products (Abken (1994),
Becketti (1993), Stout  (1996)). The explosive growth in derivatives during the last ten
years brings trading at levels exceeding $20 trillion (Remolona (1992)).'  However, there
is little known and published about the internal organization and functioning of these
exchanges.  Both academic research and the popular press have dealt with the exchange
mainly from the perspective of a "black box."
A  variety of  elements make up  the  microstructure  of  a  derivatives exchange.
Elements include the regulatory  oversight, the order flow and trade execution, market
making mechanisms, settlements and clearing procedures and exchange monitoring and
enforcements.  Study of the microstructure of derivatives exchanges around the world
yields policy recommendations for designing  new derivatives markets.  The examination of
derivatives architecture  also  offers rich data  useful in  analyzing the  relationships and
linkages among critical exchange parameters on the one hand and the broad  economic
environment on the other hand.
It  is widely accepted  that the primary function of  the derivatives market is  to
facilitate the transfer of risk among economic agents by offering mechanisms for liquidity
and  price  discovery.  In  a  well-designed derivatives market  resources  are  efficiently
allocated and risk-sharing arrangements are optimum.  Since derivatives markets perform
the same function, we pose the following questions: are elements of exchange architecture
and  microstructure  the  same  across  derivatives markets?  Are  the  institutional  and
1 According  to the BIS,  at the end of 1996  the notional  principle  outstanding  of tinancial  derivatives
approarched  $35 trilion,  or which  approximately  $10 trillion  was in exchange-traded  instruments  and the
rest in over-the-counter.
3regulatory  structures  uniform  across  derivatives  markets?  Provided  that  there  are
differences, what does explain these differences?
One  point  of  view  advocating similar structures  (architecture)  of  derivatives
exchanges across markets is based on the idea of competitive global services.  Derivatives
exchanges provide services to economic agents regardless of their location.  Mobility of
capital  and  glabalization  of  securities  trading  requires  an  exchange  to  maintain  a
microstructure  comparable to  other exchanges competing in  the  international market.
Since the function of the derivatives exchange is the same across countries -- to facilitate
risk transferring -- local institutional structures are adapted to accommodate this function.
In  this broad  setting, the  financial infrastructure consists of the  legal  and accounting
procedures, the organization of trading and clearing facilities, and the regulatory structures
that  govern  the  relations  among  the  users  of  the  derivatives exchange.  Therefore,
according  to  this  view,  the  global  competitive environment presumes  an  exchange
microstructure which is exogenously specified.  Organizational arrangements and elements
of  market  microstructure  are  uniform across  countries  in  order  to  accommodate  a
standardized exchange function.
An opposing view advocates the notion of uniqueness and specificity in derivatives
exchange architecture.  The premise of this view is based on the conceptual research of
Merton  and  Bodie  (1995)  that  links  the  functions of  the  financial system  with  the
organizational arrangements that  these functions are  performed.  Although  the  basic
functions performed  by  the  financial system  are  stable  across  time  and  place,  the
institutional arrangements employed to perform these functions are not.  As innovation
and competition produce greater efficiency in the performance of functions, over  time,
institutional form follows function.  According to this view one would expect that while
the function performed by  a  derivatives exchange is  the  same across countries,  the
institutional arrangements that allow an exchange to perfoirm  these finctions  may not  be
uniform across countnes.
It  becomes an  empirical issue to  investigate the extent  to  which elements  of
derivatives exchange architecture  and  microstructure  difFer across  markets.  Empirical
research will document variations, if any, in infrastructure parameters.
The paper is organized in two parts.  Part one presents the general principles in
setting-up  an  exchange.  In  section A  we  discuss the  relevance  of  architecture  for
derivatives markets  and  in  section  B  we  analyze major  elements  of  architecture  in
derivatives exchanges.  Part two presents the results from the survey.  In section A we
discus the development of the survey instrument and  data gathering. In  section B we
report the empirical analysis and in section C we present the lessons learned.  This is
followed by the summary and conclusions.
4PART 1: GENERAL PRINCIPLES IN SETTING UP AN EXCHANGE
A. The relevance of market architecture
Exchange  architecture  encompasses formal  structures  and  systems  created  to
ensure  orderly trading and execution of exchange transactions.  These are elements of
design that make up a complex organization.  The architecture may become a form  of
competitive  advantage  to  the  degree  that  it  motivates,  facilitates, or  enables  price
discovery and eliminates asymmetric information. Perhaps the largest single influence on
exchange architecture has been the evolution of technology (Chapman (1994)).  Modern
finance theory treats a derivatives exchange as an information processor -- a mechanism
that  facilitates information production  and  transfer  of  information across  agents  and
constituencies with the ultimate objective of improving fair price discovery.
The architecture of  an exchange follows an  evolutionary process.  Advances in
communications and technology make the study of  derivatives exchanges even harder-
(Chapman (1994),  Stout  (1996)). The evolution  has raised innumerable policy  issues
relating to market structure and stability.
Derivatives exchanges are considered intermediaries part of the financial system.
The institutional structure of the financial system changes and evolves over time. Merton
and Bodie (1995) argue that financial intermediaries differ across borders; they present a
framework that explains how and why the institutional structure of the financial system
changes over time.  They advocate that the financial system performs six core functions
which are the same across time and place.  These functions include methods of clearing
and  settling  payments,  mechanisms for  pooling  of  resources,  ways  of  transferrinig
economic resources across time and distance, methods of managing risk, including risk
pooling and risk sharing, methods for pricing information, and ways to resolve incentive
problems. Provided that markets are not integrated, organizational arrangements to fuilfil
these functions are different across markets. With intense competition and continiuous
innovation, institutional arrangements always follow the functions.
The  framework developed  by  Merton  and  Bodie  (1995)  is  applicable  at  the
institutional level, that is, at the level of the derivatives exchange, and helps explain the
uniqueness of  the  institutional form  of  the  exchange and  the  particular  (indigenous)
features  of the exchange structure. The core function of  a  derivatives exchange  is to
facilitate the transfer of risk among economic agents by offering mechanisms for liquidity
and  price  discovery.  While  the same  across  time  and  place,  this  fuinction may  be
performed under various organizational arrangements in different countries.  For example,
the organizational arrangements for clearing and settling transactions may be  different
between an  American and  a European derivatives exchange, although both  may trade
similar contracts. The application of this conceptual framework allows us to explain why
we observe different derivatives market structures and why the architecture and regulation
for  derivatives  is  not  the  same  across  markets.  Most  importantly,  the  fuinctional
perspective offers explanations about the differences in elements of microstructure  and
regulation across exchanges. Therefore, we examine the features of derivatives exchanges
5and elements of  market lay out. To  investigate the  extent to  which the functional
perspective by  Merton and Bodie (1995) has validity, we  take a  rather empirical
perspective  and rely solely on factual  data.  We look at schemes  that work and make an
effort to determine  if there are commonalities  across  markets  and  exchanges.
We suggest that this examination  of derivatives  market architecture  is important
for several  reasons. First, knowledge  of architecture  provides  insights  into the workings
of derivatives  market through examination  of features of the exchange, including  the
market-making  mechanism,  the exchange  ownership  structure, and the linkages  among
several  exchange  functions  that allow  disciplined  order  tlow and execution  of transactions.
Second, the architecture  is important  in that it may encourage  or prevent the smooth
transferability  of risk through  trading.  Third,  the architecture  is critical  to the debate  over
information  dissemination  in the market place. As long as derivatives  contracts traded in
an exchange  complete  investors' information  set, the architecture  of the exchange  plays  a
role in the production of information.  Fourth, the architecture  of the exchange may
enhance or reduce problems  arising from high or low volume of transactions (market
liquidity).  Fifth, market arrangements  have relevance  for the long-term properties of
derivatives  contracts  and the underlying  asset returns or for investors  who have horizons
beyond  the trading  session. Both trading activity  and price determination  are sensitive  to
institutional arrangements.  The architecture of  the market seeks to  illuminate  this
connection  and provide a scientific  basis for preferring  one form of market design over
another.  Finally,  aspects of architecture  may indicate the importance  of private versus
public information  in determining  investors' demands lor un-bundling,  separation, and
transfer  of different  types of risk to the public  sector  via the exchange.
B. Elements  of Architecture
1.0 The role of information
The objective  of a derivatives  market  design  is to imaxlinize  investor  risk  protection
by offering  liquidity  in contracts  designed  for hedging  purposes or risk containment.  It is
well  understood  that a contract  is liquid  when it can be traded quickly,  at low cost, and at
a price  that reflects  its intrinsic  or fair value. For a given  supply  and demand  of derivatives
contracts, liquidity  decreases  with the time that traders  have available  to trade. However,
increases  in the time available  for trading  contributes  to market  continuity.
In a continuous  market, there may  be asymmetric  information  among  participants.
Asymmetric  information  results in price deviations  from true value and creates market
destabilization  problems. There is no empirical  evidence  that provides  precise  measures  of
the length  of such periods of destabilization,  but we do know of persistent  deviations  as a
result of a market crash or overheated  expectations  (the case of speculative  bubbles).
With the availability  of information  technology  and disclosure  rules imposed  by regulatory
authorities,  deviations  resulting  from temporary  asymmetric  information  among  agents are
likely  to be short-lived.
A derivatives  exchange  is complete  only  when there is a supporting  infrastructure.
The infrastructure  includes  the management  of order flow, the price stabilization  features
6or circuit breakers introduced in the market, the market-making mechanism, the settlement
and clearing procedures, exchange monitoring, and control and enforcement functions.
2.0 Order Flow and Trade Execution
A distinct feature of design in a derivatives exchange is the form of order flow and
trade execution.  Depending on the automation and sophistication of the market, the order
flow may be (a) face to face between the interested parties; (b) via telephone; or (c) via
computer.  Trading may be completed (a) through floor trading; (b) telephone trading;
and/or (c) computer trading (Gennotte and Leland (1994)).
Central  to  the issue of order  flow is the way orders  arrive for  execution in a
derivatives exchange and the possibility of excessive supply or demand of orders arriving
in  the  market  place  (Domowitz (1995)).  In  some instances, the  order  flow  may be
transitory or temporal; that is, buy and sell orders are short-lived. Temporal imbalances in
order flow could occur occasionally over a long trading day.  As orders accumulate, there
is less chance of making an error to offset a true price, because the order flow imbalance is
short-lived  (i.e., orders  are quickly executed).  Under this  scenario, continuity in  the
market, although desirable, should be sacrificed in order to provide time for more orders
and information to accumulate. Therefore, temporal consolidation of order flow allows the
market to self-corTect  possible transitory imbalances in the flow of orders.
In other instances, however, the order  flow may be highly fragmented (spatial).
Consolidation  of  a  fragmented  order  flow  creates  the  potential  for  asymmetries in
observing  the  aggregate  spectrum  of  volume.  If  the  order  flow  is  consolidated
(aggregated), it will be unclear if each market participant can observe the whole order
flow prior to responding to the signal of high volume or whether the market participant is
responding  to  only a small part  of the  order flow.  Under this  scenario, the market
participant  must  exercise judgment  in  assessing two  simultaneous  possibilities (a)  an
observed  order  flow imbalance is either  short-lived and  temporary,  or  long-term  and
permanent; and (b) the imbalance is offset by an  opposite imbalance faced by another
market participant.
3.0 Price Stabilization Features
Generally, price stabilization helps the market to  adjust to  temporal imbalances.
Derivatives exchanges in an effort to avoid overreaction to market news and information
have introduced two basic mechanisms that provide price stabilization: trading halts and
price limits. Trading halts suspend trading for a period of time to  allow for a  cool-off
period and reassessments of expectations and market information by market participants.
Trade then resumes. Price limits allow for a maximum variation of price changes in a
contract relative to previous day's closing price.  After the maximum price imnit  allowed is
reached, trading is suspended for the next day.  All these mechanisms work as circuit-
breakers in the market and allow participants to absorb more information prior to making
informed trading decisions.
7However, circuit breakers were controversial when they were introduced and they
have remained so.  Their advocates claim that trading restrictions are essential to  keep
market  declines from tuming into panics.  Their critics argue that circuit breakers could
lead to increased market volatility. 2 The debate over the usefulness of such mechanisms is
centered  on the  argument of what  causes extreme changes in  derivative prices.  One
possible  cause  could  be  that  economic fundamentals have suddenly  changed  leading
market  participants to  drastically revise their  expectations.  If  this  argument  is  true,
mechanisms that restrict trade are damaging because they reduce the efficiency of the price
discovery system of the exchanges.  An alternative cause of price swings is that price
changes may be due to a temporary surge of supply or dernand for a particular derivative
contract.  It is this second argument that lies behind the concept of circuit breakers.  By
halting trade, it gives market participants a time-out in which they work out whether a
large  price  swin1g  is  due  to  something  temporary  (transitory)  or  something  more
fundamental (permanent).
4.0 Market-Making Mechanisms
The  agents  that provide continuity and  smoothness in  the  order  flow  are  the
market-makers.  The  physical and  legal  form  of  the  agents  who  participate  at  the
exchange, their obligations, and the nature of their buying and selling activities determine
the degree of market liquidity.  The amount of market continuity provided by market-
makers may be more or less similar to that provided by brckers, depending on diff'erences
in their position vis-a-vis the order flow, their obligations, and their capital requirements.
The number of members involved in the order  flow may create increased competitive
conditions in the market and thus enhance market liquidity.  We can identify alternative
market-making agents: firms, individuals/speculators,  brokers, or dealers.  The differences
among these alternatives are based on the institutional setting of organizing the activity.
5.0 Settlement and Clearing Procedures
The most critical function in a derivatives exchange is the settlement and clearing
of trades. The function of the clearing house or clearing organization is to smooth possible
problems  of  counterparty  credit  risk  by  standardizing  and  simplifying transaction
processing between participants and the organization (the clearing house).  The clearing
organization by design represents a secure environment for absorbing settlement failures
(Hentschel and Smith (1996), Mengle (1995)). The potential for credit losses is dependent
on the provisions for sufficient capitalization of agents involved in clearing the transactions
(Iben and Ratcliffe (1994)).
Critical parameter  choices  concerning  the  settlernent and  clearing  procedures
include the ownership of the services, the organizational form, and the nature of netting
services. There  are four  alternative ownership forms for  clearing houses: government
ownership,  single-sector  ownership, multisector  ownership  and  exchange  ownership.
Sector ownership involves the participation of financial institutions (such as banks) or
institutions/firms from other  sectors  of the economy in  the  ownership of  the clearing
2  According  to some  analysts,  the introduction  of circuit  breakers  had negligible  effect in the volatility  of
US stock prices (see  for example  Lauterbach  and Ben-Zion  (1993)).
Xfacility.  In deciding the ownership of a clearing house, there are trade-offs between long-
term financial support and balancing competing interests.  The organizational form of the
clearing facility is a function of the structure of a country's financial services sector, public
policy goals  and  the bargaining power  of market participants.  One approach  in  the
organizational  structure  is  to  form  a  single  entity  that  handles  both  clearing  and
settlement/custody services.  Another approach is to  separate  the facilities of clearing
services from those of settlement/custody services.
6.0 Ownership Issues
Clearing typically involves processing the details of the transactions including trade
reporting, confirmation, matching, reconciliation, and sorting of trades.  The processing of
trades has been traditionally the business of exchanges.  Settlement involves the exchange
of  securities  for  funds. This  has  traditionally been  a  business  for  banks  and  other
intermediaries acting as safekeepers.
One critical issue is the ownership structure for each of the fuLnctions  and its links
to the exchange.  Clearing and settlement may be performed in separate organizations or
in  a  combined  entity.  The  state  or  government  may  exercise  control  over  these
organlizations  and dictate ownership structures that serve its interests.  For example, to
achieve efficiencies and economies of scale, a country may want to  clear transactions in
both the treasury/bond market and the derivatives market via a central government entity.
7.0 Netting
Netting  is  defined as  a  process of  reducing multiple obligations with  various
counterparties  to  fewer  obligations or  a  single obligation.  The use  of netting  in  the
settlement of transactions produces greater efficiencies at high transaction volumes, and
operating procedures for netting transactions are considered essential in minimizing  credit
losses among agents (Hendricks (1994)).  There are several forms of netting, each with its
own peculiarities.  Bilateral netting is an arrangement between two  parties to  net the
payment obligations on certain contracts between them.  A variation of bilateral netting is
position netting.  This is an agreement that nets payments across multiple contracts  but
keeps each contract distinct.
Netting by novation involves the merging of all traded contracts into a single net
position requiring one party to pay the other.  Multilateral netting involves replacing a
participant's many transactions with many other participants by relatively few transaction1s
done with the clearing company.  "Buy" transactions are offset with "sell" transactions to
arrive at a  net position -- obligation or gain -- relative to  the clearing company.  The
important  element here  is that  the connections  in the  transaction  between  individual
participan-ts  are erased.  In this environment, each participant faces the risk of dealinlg  with
the clearing company. Depending on the risk control mechanisms adopted by the clearing
company, participants may exposed to zero counterparty credit risk.
Two variations of multilateral netting appear to be very popular. Trade-for-trade
netting involves a process of matching each transaction on an individual basis.  Individual
9transactions retain their identity while passing through the clearing and settlement services.
Continuous  net settlement (CNS) combines all transactions in a  given security.  These
transactions are netted together to determine a single (positive or negative) position.  In
essence, all a participant's transactions in a given security are combined.  The result is a
single obligation to deliver securities to the clearing house or the right to obtain securities
from  the clearing house.  A net funds position is calculated.  Rights  and  obligations
between participants are replaced with rights and  obligations to  anid from the clearing
house.
In addition to multilateral netting, there are other forms of transaction settlement.
Settlement  can  take  place  through  physical  delivery  of  certificates  to  the  clearing
company.  Certified based  settlement  (CBS) is  not  an  efficient method  of  achieving
settlement for even small transaction volumes because of the manual process of issuing
certificates, sealing certificates in envelopes addressing them to  participants. Since the
clearing house acts as a post office by receiving the envelopes, sorting them and delivering
them to the participants, the process is slow.
Delivery versus payment (DVP) invQlves  the simultaneous exchange of securities
and  payments.  To  achieve efficiencies in  delivery versus  payment,  netting  requires
settlement mechanisms to move securities and funds positions at the same time, since the
method requires the final delivery of securities to occur if and only if final payment occurs.
To  manage an  effective the settlement process in a  derivatives market, several
ancillary services are required:  centralized contract depository system that interfaces with
the clearing system, an automated coding system of identifying participants within the
process, risk monitoring and control mechanisms that assess the credit risk of participants
in the market, and rigorous disaster recovery procedures to guard against the unexpected.
The legal and regulatory environment should also allow netting and contracts assignments.
8.0 Exchange Monitoring, Control, and Enforcement Functions
The exchange functions as a club where interested parties participate with  the
objective of  risk  reallocation.  It  is  obvious  that  beyond  any  social benefits, agents
involved in the trading of derivatives contracts essentially "trade quantities of risk" with
the objective of attaining profitability in their transactions.  Provided that profitability has
no  upper  limits,  it  is necessary for  the  exchange to  develop  a  function  to  monitor
members, control  trading  activities, and  enforce professional conduct  in  a  symmetric
fashion and ensure a level playing field for all participants.  This simple idea, although
universally accepted, is difficult to implement.
A great variety of mechanisms for monitoring anid  enforcement may be used to
achieve the same basic objective of self-regulation  in a derivatives market.  Yet, there is a
trade-off.  Too  much self-regulation imposes constraints on participating members and
hampers the development of an exchange market.  Too litltle  regulation, on the other hand,
opens the possibility of misconduct.
10Some critical issues for smooth self-regulation of a derivatives exchange include:
(a)  Ownership and control.  Shareholders of  the exchange include parties  that
represent the broad constituency of the derivatives market.  Specialization and division of
labor today  has resulted  in  separation of  ownership and  control  in exchanges. As  in
corporations, managerial talent has been developed for administering the activities of a
derivatives exchange on behalf of its owners (Jensen and Meckling (1976)).  In some
cases,  government  in  developing countries  appoint  the  management  team  to  ensure
relevant experience.  Owners of the exchange then become passive shareholders.  The
resulting separation of ownership from control could create several conflicts of interest
between appointed manages and constituents of the exchange. This could result in sub-
optimal decisions regarding monitoring, self-regulatory enforcement, and risk-reallocation.
The  well known  agency  problem refers  to  the  divergence of  interests  between  the
decision-makers  (management)  and  the  owners  (constituents).  Conflicts  of  interest,
deadweight losses, and agency-related costs are reduced through three mechanisms: (1)
when  the exchange constituents are  the owners of  the exchange, (2)  the constituents
develop the capacity to monitor effectively the activites of appointed managers, and (3)
the exchange operates in a competitive global environment.
(b)  Independence and  objectivity in  the  self-regulatory process.  The  internal
organizational structure of the exchange plays a critical role in ensuring independence and
objectivity in decision-making. Decisions that lead to an optimal seLf-regulatory  structure
depend  on  the internal organization of the exchange.  To  ensure  maximum benefits,
decisions should be decomposed into two categories of tasks, decision management and
decision control,  with each category  assigned to  different officers within the exchange
organization.
Decision management refers to  the initiation of decisions for new contracts  and
self-regulation of participating members of the exchange, and the implementation of such
decisions.  Decision control refers to the ratification and monitoring of the decisions and
the provision of rewards or penalties to those implementing the decisions.  By delegating
the functions of decision management and decision control to  different individuals, the
exchange minimizes the chance that opportunistic behavior of agents-members will lead to
actions detrimental to the reputation of the exchange.
The  separation  of  decision management  from  decision  control  ensures  that
professional actions are consistent with the interests of the general constituency of the
exchange, and makes it more difficult  for any individual  within the organizational structure
to engage in counter-productive behavior. To  allow for efficient decision-making while
controlling possible agency costs, an exchange should establish an internal organizational
structure in which professionals who initiate and implement the new contracts are different
from those who perform the ratification and monitoring of the new contract introduction.
If this is not the case, and separation is not present, the top management of the exchange
could  introduce and  implement a  new regulation or contract  that  is potentially in  the
interest of  only a small constituency of the exchange.
II9.0 The Dynamics of Derivatives Exchange Regulation: Se,!f-regulation  and external
regulation
Two additional issues for the organization of the derivatives markets remain for
discussion. First, the regulation of derivatives  exchanges at the level of the exchange itself
(internal regulation), and the second, the external regulation of derivatives exchanges.
While a variety of mechanisms are used for exchange monitoring and enforcement,
it is the exchange itself that determines a self-imposing  rules for its members.  We suggest
that  in  determining member rules  a  derivatives exchange  follows  a  rather  economic
approach by looking at the marginal benefits and marginal costs of the self-imposed rules.
The necessity of  attracting investors who have alternatives leads exchanges to
choose  rules and listing standards that produce benefits to investors until  the marginal
value that investors attach to further benefits outweights the marginal cost of providing
them.  Self-interested exchange members will produce rules that investors want for the
same reasons  that  self-interested economic agents produce  the  kind  of  products  that
consumers want. Like all economic agents, an exchange competes with other exchanges
by providing mechanisms for liquidity, by attracting specialzed contracts characterized by
uniqueness and specificity, and by inducing investors to  purchase listed contracts.  The
securities market as a whole also competes for investor funds with other sectors of the
economy.
The  exchange's  incentives to  provide rules  and  enforcement  mechanisms that
increase investors'  retumns,  is justified by the desire to  inrcrease investors'  demand for
listed contracts. The competition for investors funds and for the use of exchange trading
facilities depends on the desirability of listed contracts as hedging or speculative tools.  A
contract may attract the investor interest only by offering attractive risk-adjusted returns.
Appropriate  disclosures  reduce  the  difference  between. investors'  expectation  and
contract's  performance.  The  exchange  then  may  reduce  the  divergence  by  making
necessary rules to maintain financial and other disclosures.
In fact, for most of their history exchanges, especially stock exchanges, have been
the primary regulators of securities markets.  Among other items, they detelmine internal
standards of financial responsibility for brokers and dealers, intermediate between issuers
and  investors, enforce disclosures that  listed contracts  need to  maintain for investors'
protection, and they supply rules for member contact.
While derivatives exchanges have incentives to  increase investors'  demand for
traded contracts, the desirability of the contracts depends on the specific organization of
the trading  market  and  the  supporting institutional infrastructure.  A  specific market
organization may offer  contracts  with more  or  less liquidity, price  impact, speed  of
execution  and  reliability of  performance at  a  greater  or  lesser  cost.  Investors  as  a
heterogeneous  group  with  ample alternatives typically differ in  terms  of  preferences.
Some investors may prefer lower trading costs to more rapid execution and others prefer a
12less  liquid  but  more  transparent  market.  We  therefore,  observe  markets  adopting
dissimilar rules  and  procedures  to  cater  to  different cienteles  (Harris  (1993)).  An
exchange survives only if a sufficient member of investors find it worthwhile to purclhase
exchange-listed contracts.  The above discussion suggests that  self-regulatory rules foir
derivatives exchanges may not  be uniform across markets. Derivatives exchanges offter
contracts  and  specific  disclosure  rules  to  serve  the  needs  of  investors  who  hold
heterogeneous objectives.
While there is a wide range of alternatives when it comes to the self-regulation of a
derivatives exchange, the external regulation is subject to limited choices. The regulation
may be the function of state, local, or national agencies. It may be based on the oversight
of an independent agency of the government such as the CFTC in the United States. Still
another alternative is the regulation to follow the approach of the state member of the
European Union which has adopted directives relating to disclosures and market structure
to which national legislation must conform. Despite the institutional choices for setting up
an external regulatory enviromnent, there are certain principles that an external regulatory
agency follows.  These are presented in Box 1. below.
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Taken into account  the theory and practice for derivatives exchange regulation
several alternatives may be considered for global derivatives exchange regulation.  At one
end of the spectrum, regulation may be performed through a global regulatory body that
maintains the authority to adopt and enforce exchange rules.  Another alternative would
have been to harmonize national regulations in a way that exchanges are subject to the
same  rules.  A  third  alternative  for  global  derivatives  regulation  requires  greater
coordination in the sense that national regulatory agencies would agree to  give priority
status to the removal of gaps or inconsistencies  in national regulation that make it difficult
for capital to flow freely or easy for fraud to flow freely.
13PART  2: EMPIRICAL  RESULTS  FROM  A SURVEY
A. Data --The  Survey  Instrument
To examine the organization form of derivatives markets and especially issues of
derivatives microstructure,  we  relied on  factual data.  Due  to  lack  of other  primary
empirical sources of information we designed a  questionnaire and identified parameters
that reflect the functioning of the derivatives market.
1.0 Questionnaire Design
For  data gathering we construct  an instrument in  the form of a  formal sulvey
questionnaire.  This consists of four parts.  The first part requests participants to give the
year the exchange was founded, its ownership, and the exchange membership. We make
an  attempt  to  differentiate between  full or  regular  members and  associate  or  limited
members and clearing/non-clearing  members of an exchange.  We further decompose the
categories  of  members into  financial institutions,  security  firm,  independent  broker,
independent market-maker,  individual, and foreign entity,  and  request  information on
capital requirements and annual membership fees.  To learn more about membership, we
request information on the requirements for each membership category.  Finally, in the
first section of the questionnaire we ask about the regulation of the exchange by providing
predetermined answers such as via parliament, via parliamentary law, via a government
committee, self-regulated, or via government ministry.
The second part of the questionnaire focuses on exchange-traded products and
contracts. We seek to identify the type of contracts traded on the exchanges, the number
of contracts, and the annual combined volume for each contract traded. To provide some
degree  of uniformity across exchanges, we specify ten categories  of contracts  traded:
agriculture: grains, food and fiber; agriculture: meat and  livestock; currencies; energy;
equity;  index; interest  rates; non-precious metals; precious  metals; and  swaps.  The
categorization allows comparisons of products across different country economies.
Also in the second part of the survey, we ask questions related to the sequencing
of contracts  introduced  in the derivatives market.  We  ask participating exchanges to
identify the date  and the contract type that was first introduced for trading.  We also
request information on contracts de-listed from the exchange.  De-listed contracts may
indicate lack of market depth or absence of certain economic/financial  conditions (such as
low  volatility in  interest  rates)  for  the  trading of  particular contracts.  We  request
information about the type of contract, the date the contract was introduced, and the date
the contract was canceled.
The  third  part  of  the  survey  explores  issues  of  market-making,  by  asking
participants to  indicate the  market-making system used  on  their derivatives exchange.
Market-making alrangements include open outcry, market-maker, integrated registration
and real-time clearing systems, electronic screen-based systems, and open  outcry with
mark-to-market gross margining.  For exchanges with some history, we also sought to
14determine whether there has been any change in the market-making, a change that may
reflect changes in the technological environments and/or the regulatory infrastructure.
In the  fourth part  of  the survey, participating exchanges are  asked  to  identify
procedures  used for clearing transactions. Clearing transactions may involve a  central
bank,  or  be  performed through  bank guarantees,  an  independent company organized
separately from the exchange, or a company affiliated with the exchange that sets its own
margin requirements.  Particular attention is paid to  uncovering the ownership  of the
clearing house with explicit requests to  account for each one of the six most common
categories  of  members  (banks,  securities  firm, independent brokers,  market  makers.
foreign  entities, individuals) in  terms  of  number of  members  and  proportion  of  the
corresponding ownership. Finally, a settlement system may involve different procedures
for completing the order flow of  transactions.  The survey asks participatinig  exchanges to
specify one of three types of settlement procedure: bilateral netting, netting by novation,
or multilateral netting.
2.0 SurveY Distribution
We distributed the survey to 75 exchanges located in 29 countries.  Table 1 reports
the exchanges to  which the survey was distributed.  The survey was distributed during
June and July 1996.  Original responses were received by the end of July 1996, but  by
August 20, reminder letters were sent to those that had not  responded.  Answers were
compiled and analyzed during the fall of 1996.
Special attention is given to sampling errors, which occur because observations are
not homogeneous.  Because of systematic biases, survey data can be very reliable but still
be low in validity.  To ensure the validity of the gathered data a high response rate was
required.  Alreck and Settle (1985) report that validity problems are not an issue when in
survey responses exceeding 50 percent.
As of the deadline of September 30, 1996, we counted 42 responses.  Table 2,
Panel A, reports the survey responses by exchange name.  Given the response rate of 56
percent, the survey data are considered reliable, and problems of validity are considered
limited.
B. Empirical Evidence
1.0 Emerging vs. Developed Derivatives Markets
This conjecture raises the crucial issue of distinguishing between developed anid
emerging  exchanges.  To  make  inferences about  differences  between  emerging  and
developed derivatives exchanges, it is necessary to develop an objective way to  separate
exchanges into these two groupings.
We considered three classification procedures.  First, we focus on  a  country's
economic development.  Using as a proxy the World Bank's classification of countries as
developed or developing according to income level, we classified derivatives markets in
developed  and  emerging.  Countries like  the  US,  Canada,  and  Japan  are  consider-ed
15developed.  Countries like Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, China, Philippines, Hungary,
Malaysia, India, and Russia with upper-middle-income levels or low-hicome levels are
considered emerging. Only 27.5 percent of the countries in the total sample are considered
emerging.
The second classification focuses on the stage of development of the country's
equity capital market. To find the stage of development of the capital market, we rely on
the  Intemational  Finance Corporation  (IFC)  "Emerging  Stock  Market  Fact  Book"
(1988-1995) for various years and classify capital markets as emerging or developed.  In
an emerging market,  we considered the derivatives exchanges as emerging.  All other
derivatives exchanges were  classified as developed. This classification yields again the
same proportion of countries of 27.5 percent emerging derivatives exchanges.
Third, we considered the maturity or aging of the derivatives exchange measured
by the number of years the exchange has been in operation. We identified years in which
the first derivatives exchanges were established in  all countries and calculated that the
median number of years a  typical exchange in the sample of 29 countries has been in
operation is 14 years.  Exchanges in operation for more than 14 years were considered
developed, and exchanges in operations for less than 14 years were considered emerging.
According this  criterion, in 51  percent  of the countries,  the exchanges are considered
emerging.  This  approach  is more  ambiguous than the  previous  two,  however,  and
requires  caution. An exchange that has been established recently is not necessarily less
advanced than one established some time ago.  Recently established exchanges are actually
more technologically advanced than older ones.  What is different, however, is a lack of
experience and less historical information about volatility in a recently established market,
which may relate to a markets success or failure.
In our analysis, we distinguish exchanges based on the stage of development of the
country's  capital market. That is, using the classification provided by the IFC emerging
markets factbook, we identified the stage of development of a country's capital market and
classified derivatives exchanges as developed and emerging.
2.0 Products and Contract Classification
2.1 Chronology of Contract Introduction
We  analyze contracts  by  examining the  contract  type,  sequence  of  contract
introduction,  and  distribution  of  contracts  across  exchanges.  The  most  popular
derivatives contracts in exchanges are index (equity) based products, followed by interest
rate based products, and then agricultural commodities.
To determine the sequencing of products introdueed on a typical exchange, Table
3  reports  the  chronology  of  the  type  of  exchange-traded  contracts  introduced,  the
exchange, and the country in which the exchange is located.  The first agricultural contract
introduced  was  in  1859 at  the  Chicago Board  of  Trade.  A  currency contract  was
introduced  at  the Chicago  Mercantile Exchange in  1963, and  an equity  product  was
introduced in 1973 by the Chicago Board of Options Exch[ange. The sequence over all is
16agricultural, followed by non-precious metals, precious metals, currencies, interest rates,
equities, energy, indexes and swaps.
The examination of the total sample reveals that historically derivatives exchanges
first  introduced  agricultural  contracts  retlecting  the  significance  of  a  sector  that
contributed  to  economic development at  that  time.  Globalization of  transactions  andi
exchange  rate  volatility led  to  the  development of  currency  contracts.  These  wer-e
fo'lowed by interest rate contracts and contracts based on domestic stocks or an index of
stocks as a result of capital mobility and the development of domestic capital markets in
emerging markets.
To  determine if the sequence of derivative product introduction is the same for
developed and  emerging derivatives markets, we  examine the  chronology  of product
introduction  for  developed  markets  and  emerging  markets.  Emerging  markets  lag
developed markets in terms of the length of time it takes to introduce derivatives products.
In  other  words,  it  takes  relatively more  time  to  introduce  a  derivatives contract  in
emerging markets compared to developed ones. A noticeable difference is that emerging
markets introduce (stock) index products relatively more quickly than developed markets.
The data also reveal that while historicalV exchanges first introduced derivative
instruments for agricultural commodities, more recently exchanges first introduce interest
rate products followed by index-based and equity derivative products. The globalization of
commodity markets and agricultural market liberalization in emerging economies has
reduced the interest in the development of commodity derivatives relatively to financial
derivatives. This can be due to the following reasons. First, commodity market
liberalization has increased the pass-through of international commodity price movements
to domestic commodity prices making the use of existing commodity derivative contracts
feasible for domestic hedgers.  In other words, the basis risk for usinlg  existing derivative
contracts has been declining. For example, Mexican wheat producers may now find that
using the CBOT wheat futures contract as an appropriate one for hedging Mexican wheat
price risk.  Thus, the need to develop a Mexican wheat contract may be reduced.
Second, financial markets are more country specific and the demand for derivative
instruments mainly comes from  domestic users.  Equity based products  are based  on
equities in the local stock market and interest rate derivatives are based on the local bond
market.  More recently institutional investors have taken an interest in these products.  For
example, an institutional investor who would like to  take a positioII in  the local stock
imarket  could purchase (or sell) futures on the equity index.  Also, an investor-  who would
like to purchase a stock of a local company but would like to be hedged against a drop
that  would  affect  local stocks  across  the board  could  purchase a  put  option  on  the
domestic equity index.  Thus,  the market (country) specificity of financial instruments
('stocks, bonds, currencies) usually makes derivatives based on these instruments to appear
iin  local markets.  The introduction of derivative instruments usually follow as a natural
development of the domestic capital markets.  However, there are cases where derivative
instruments based on one market are traded in another market.  For example, the Nikkei
17225 stock  average is traded  at CME in Chicago, LIFFE in London  trades Italian and
German bonds, and the Brazilian real trades at CME.
Third, experience has  shown  that  financial derivatives attract  relatively higher
liquidity compared to  the commodity derivative contracts.  For example, the Budapest
Commodity Exchange  experienced a  dramatic increase  in the  volume traded  when  it
introduced financial derivative contracts (mainly currency) in addition to  its commodity
derivatives contracts.  In the Sao Paolo Commodities and Futures Exchange (BM&F), the
turnover of all agricultural contracts traded was about $3.5 billion for 1996, representing
only one percent of the total value of contracts traded which amounted to no less than
$4.2  trillion.  At  the two  Chicago exchanges, CBOT  and CME,  agricultural trading
volumes were less than 30% and 5% of the total trading volumes, respectively.
2.2 Sequencing of Contract Introduction
For  all derivatives contracts  introduced in the global marketplace, we seek  to
determine the most frequently introduced first contract  and the type of contracts  that
follow.  Table  4  reports  for  all  markets  that  the  most  representative  contract  first
introduced on an exchange is an agricultural contract with a count of 24 contracts  and
fraction  of  occurrence of  30.4  percent  (Panel A,  first  group).  The  second  contract
introduced is the equity or index-related contract with equal  counts of 12 cases each and
fraction of occurrences of 28.6 percent (second group).  The third contract is an interest
rate product.
This sequence of contract introduction is different for emerging and  developed
exchanges (Panel B and C). In emerging markets, index products are introduced first then
followed by another  (equity) index product  and an  interest  rate  product, and  then a
currency product.  Developed markets introduce agriculture products followed by equity
and  interest  rate  products.  This  is  mainly because  several  exchanges in  developed
countries  have  been  established  some  time  ago  when  agricultural  products  (and
commodities in general) were more important in the overall economy and capital markets
were less developed.  However, more recently, newly established exchanges in developed
markets introduce first financial derivative products  based on equity indexes, individual
stocks, interest rates and currencies.  Thus, among newly established derivative markets
there is little distinction between emerging and developed in the sequencing of contract
introduction.
2.3  Timing of Successive Product Introduction
Table 5 describes  the time elapsed between successive  contract introductions  on
derivatives exchanges.  It  reports  the number of contracts, the median, the mode, the
standard deviation, the skewness, and kurtosis of time elapsed between the first, second.
and successful contracts introduced in all derivatives markets.
For the time elapsed from the first to the second contract introduction, we search
all exchanges and identify the years the first and the second contracts were introduced for
trading.  The median number of months required between the first and the second contract
18introduction was 36 months. Between the second and  third conitract the time  was  18
months; between the third and the fourth was 48 months.
2.4 Contract de-listing
The survey allowed to identify the type of derivative contracts that are no longer
traded in exchanges.  Agricultural derivative products were the first to stop trading in an
exchange followed by index products.  The data does not cover exchange traded products
that are inactive (i.e., still listed but not traded or traded but illiquid).
3.0 Exchange Structure
3.1 Lifespan of Derivatives Exchanges
To estimate the aging or the maturity of a typical derivatives exchange we find the
date the exchange wasa established and calculate the number of years that  has been in
operation.  Panel A of Table 6 reports that the exchange median years in operation is 14
years.  Panel B of the same table reports the number of exchanges established after 1990.
Almost 24% of the responses to our survey come from exchanges that have been recently
established (after 1990).
3.2 Exchange Ownership
Table 7 reports clusters of exchanges that maintain similar ownership.  Almost 34
percent of the exchanges surveyed operate as non-profit self-governing entities (Panel A),
'while another 25 percent indicated that they are privately owned, government regulated
exchanges  (Panel C).  Smaller percentages of the  responses indicated that  exchanges
operate as a subsidiary, as a part of a larger organization (Panel B) or as a limited liability
company (Panel D). We are unable to infer any statistical differences between developed
and  emerging  derivatives markets as  far  as  the  status  of  the  exchange  ownership  is
concerned.
3.3 Regulatory structure
Table 8 reports the number of exchanges and exchange name for each type of
regulatory regime identified in survey responses.  Each of the panels appearing in Table 8
shows the type of regulation that the corresponding exchange is subject to.  Statistical
analysis of  responses  indicates that  the  prevailing regulatory  structure  in  the  survey
responses  was exercised via a  parliamentary law. 3 In almost all cases  the government
played an  important role in market  regulation in addition to  the exchange's  own self-
regulatory arrangements.
3.4  Market-making systems
Table 9 reports  the variety of market-making systems in derivatives exchanges.
'Statistical  analysis shows that the relatively more frequently cited market-making system
vvas based on an open outcry, daily mark-to-market with a gross margining. 4 However,
electronic  trading  systems  are  also  frequently  used  among  exchanges.  While  nine
exchanges of the 39 exchanges that provided information rely exclusively on electronlic
3F-value  of 3.17  aid p-value  of 0.082
4F  statistic 2.96, p-value 0.0928
19trading system, nineteen exchanges in total  employ some form of an electronic trading
system, either exclusively or in conjunction with an open outcry system (8 exchanges), or
some other system.  Also recently established derivatives exchanges are more likely to use
electronic based systems for trading.  Advocates of the electronic trading systems claim
that their adoption leads to lower trading costs and thus using futures and options will
become more attractive to  businesses and investors.  An exchange using an electronic
system could also draw business from traders around the world, significantly expanding
the potential market.  And according to its advocates, it could be safer. 5
The survey has also found that the daily mark-to--market  with a gross  margininig
system seems to apply also to the majority of recently established exchanges.  Finally, we
find no statistical significant differences in market making systems between developed and
emerging market derivatives.
3.5 Clearing House arrangements
More than 50% of the survey participants indicated that they require initial margin
deposits and margin calls, with the exchange guaranteeing the contracts through its own
clearing house.  In 30% of the survey participants the clearing was performed through an
independently organized company. And in just  three exchanges transactions are cleared
though the Central Bank or by applying bank guarantees in settling transactions.
While  there  is  some  uniformity in  margin requirements across  the  exchanges
surveyed (i.e., most exchanges require initial and variation margins with settlements made
daily), there are disparities in the ways that margin deposits are collected, whether gross
or net, and in what the clearing house accepts as collateral.  Many clearing houses accept
cash and securities as collateral.  Letters of credit could be another form of collateral.
Table 10 reports the ownership of the clearing houtse.  Panel A of Table 10 reports
the number and name of exchanges that maintain an in-house clearing organization.  From
the 39 responses to that question, 24 exchanges indicated that they own in-house clearing
facilities. Panel B of the same table reports alternative ownership arrangements for  the
ownership of the clearing house.  These include ownership by banks, financial institutions,
other exchanges, and/or multiple institutions. Among the alternatives to the own in-house
clearing facilities, ownership by other exchanges appears to be more prevalent.  Overall,
examining the clearing houses in  our survey, it is evident that  their relationships with
exchanges differ, but having a clearing house affiliated with the exchange as opposed to
existing as a separate entity appears to be the more prevalent arrangement.
3.6  Settlement Procedures
Table 11 reports  survey responses on the type of settlement used in completing
derivatives trades.  Although netting  is  frequently used,  there  is  not  a  predominanlt
settlement  procedure  used  by exchanges.  Many exchanges  use  netting  by  novation
5For example,  at the Beijing  Commodity  Exchange  each trade is checked  for adequate  margins  before the
computer  accepts  it. And the BM&F  in Sao Paolo  performs  back-office  trade  clearing  and processing;  a
task performed  by member  firms in most developed  markets.
20(merging of all traded contracts into a single net position requiring one party to  pay the
other) and multi-lateral netting (replacing a participant's many transactions vis-a-vis other
participants with fewer transactions vis-a-vis the clearing house).  The table reports  the
type of settlement used for each exchange.  There are only 25 responses to this survey
question.
3.7 Exchange member-ship
Exchange membership distinguishes between full (or regular) and associate (or
limited) members. Full members are entitled to full voting privileges pertaining to the self-
regulation of the derivatives exchange. Although associate members have the same rights
as full members in terms of trading, they do not have full voting privileges and often their
activities do not cover clearing of transactions. The promotion of associate members to a
full membership status is conditional on tenure on the job, several certification
requirements and sometimes of posting a bond required for security in clearing
transactions.  The median percentage of full or regular members is 80%, with a 76% of
full members having clearing rights. The percentage of associate members with clearing
rights is much smaller, at 16% (of the total associate members).  In emerging market
derivatives exchanges, the total number of members is much smaller than in developed
market derivatives exchanges.
4.0 Economic and capital market conditions
Using economic and capital market  data, an attempt  was made to  examine the
extent  to  which  differences in  economic and  capital  market  conditions  (indicators)
between  developed  and  emerging  economies  explain  differences  in  the  degree  of
development of  their derivative exchanges.  In other words, an attempt was made to
establish certain indicators related to economic and/or capital market colnditions for the
development of derivatives markets.  These are indicators of market  readiness for  the
development of derivatives exchanges.
As  economic proxies  we use changes in  consumer prices, prime interest  rates,
government bond yields, industrial production, real GNP growth, the level of GNP, and
the share  of  investments in GNP.  We use  data from the IMF  International Financial
Statistics  for the period  1984-92. As proxies for capital market conditions we use the
stock  market  turnover, the  stock  market  capitalization, the  variance in  stock  market
capitalization, the value traded, the volatility in value traded  and  the number of  listed
companies  in  the  stock  exchange. We  obtain  data  for  these  variables  from  the  IFC
Emerging Markets Stock Guide.
To  examine if differences between emerging and developed derivatives markets
can be explained by differences in economic and capital market conditions we estimate the
differences in means (between proxies in developed and emerging economies), via an F-
test and a p-value for all economic and capital market proxies.  We find no statistically
significant differences between emerging and developed derivatives markets with respect
to the economic proxies.  We find some differences in capital market conditions between
derivatives exchanges in emerging and developed markets, but these differences may be
21explained by the size and maturity of developed capital markets.  We conclude that our
tests  give no conclusive indicators for the degree of market readiness for developing a
derivatives exchanges.  In this respect, additional research is needed to  establish if such
indicators exist and if they do, to quantify them.
C. Lessons Learned
Derivatives exchanges are here to stay and are likely to expand substantially in
emerging markets, as they did in developed markets ove  r the last ten years (see also Box 2
below).  The research findings could provide several lessons to those involved in the
development of derivatives exchanges in emerging market economies.  These include:
*  Index-based  and interest rate derivative products stand a relatively better chance to be
introduced first in an emerging derivatives exchange.  Recent experiences indicate that
derivative instruments on agricultural products are more difficult to introduce initiall.
*  The process of introducing successful derivative products could be lengthy.
Both government regulations and a self-regulatory structure are usually needed.  There
is a fine balance between government's regulatory role and an exchange's  self-
regulations.  The basic assumption is that having a vvell-functioning  derivatives market
is in the interest of all concerned.  Governments could encourage and support
assessments of the feasibility of such markets; to assure a broad domestic and foreign
participation in the process; and to clearly define and implement the regulatory
framework.  It is up to the market participants and the exchanges to develop
appropriate products, trading mechanisms, and self-regulatory systems compatible
with the degree of market development.
- Clearing is an extremely important function.  The most preferred way is using margins
(initial and variation).  Most exchanges own their in-house clearing operations. The
second most frequently used approach is for the clearing house to be owned by other
exchanges or banks.
*  Electronic trading systems appear to be more popular among newly established
exchanges.  Lower transactions costs, easier to set-up and monitor and better
accessibility by users are frequently cited as the key benefits of the electronic trading
systems.
*  Partnerships and joint ventures between existing exchanges and newly emerged ones
can be mutually beneficiafl Newly emerged exchanges can benefit from the
6 This  is because  of several  reasons.  First,  agricultural  markets  in several  emerging  economies  are
lagging  behind  in terms of liberalization  compared  to financial  markets. Second,  financial  markets  tend
to create  much more liquidity  compared  to agricultural  markets. For example,  during  1996  the Budapest
Commodity  Exchange  increased  its liquidity  by 400%  when  it introduced  financial  contracts  (mainly
currency)  to its existing  agricultural  contracts.  Third, with  the globalization  of commodity  markets  the
potential  for using existing  contracts  in already  established  exchanges  reduces  the need to develop
agricultural  contracts  at local exchanges.
22technology and know-how of existing exchanges and existing exchanges (their
members) can gain access to a potentially high growth emerging market.  The
development of regional exchanges could improve market liquidit.  However, they
may be harder to develop as they require high coordination.
Our empirical results did not provide conclusive indicators related to the degree of
market readiness for developing a derivatives exchange.
Box 2: Why develop a derivatives  exchange in an emerging market?
.. Benefits  of derivatives  exchanges  are not limited  to  isk reallocation  and price discovery  within a
country. Additional  benefits  include,  more  publicly  available  information,  improved  transmission
of price an.d  other  marktet-.related  information,  improved  credit  systems,  more  responsive  capital
markets.  (including  providing  mueans  for firms to secure  fUrther  operating  capital),  hii  gher-:
'uniformity  in repayment  rules and market  surveillance,  reduced  transaction  costs, more  accurate
forward  prices  and, hence,  a better  allocation.  of resources,.  And  in several emerging  market
economies,  the development  of derivatives.  exchianges,  along  with stock markets,  sends a message
to international  investors  that capitalism  is not a:dirtyvword.
However,  the desirability  and effectiveness  of a .derivatives  exchange  depends  primarily  on the state
:of the country  concerned  but also on the design of that exchange,  and then on the nature of local
commodity  and fin  ancialdmarkets.  After all, an illiquid&derivatives  exchange  will very likely not
inspire  confidence  to .neither.  a foreign  or even  a domestic  agent. In several  circumstances,  rather
than.setting  up their own:derivatives  exchages, many emerging  economies  could.do better by
using other well  established  exchanges-  and listing  their products  in them. For example,  derivative
instruments  on Latin American stocks are traded in Chicago and not in their countries.  Also,
regional  exchanges  could benefit  a number  of smaller  emerging  markets.
7 For example,  CBOT is forming  such  joint ventures  with  exchanges  in countries  such as Argentina,
Poland  and Turkey.
8 The Stockholm-based  Options  Market  (OM)  is building  a regional  electronic  exchanges  linking
exchanges  in Norway,  Finland  and perhaps  Denmark.
23Summary and Conclusions
The establishment of derivatives exchanges is driven by economic, financial
reasons and, in some cases, also by national pride. The global deregulation of financial
markets and market liberalization have created new investment opportunities and lisks that
require the development of new instruments. For example, institutional investors look in
other developed and emerging markets for investments and need to hedge their risks from
these cross-border transactions.  Agents in liberalized market economies are exposed to
more risks, such as commodity price and interest rate volatility, and require appropliate
hedging products to deal with these risks.  And with the economic liberalization in
emerging economies, corporations also need better ways to manage financial and
commodity risks.
Derivatives markets are, to some extent, complementilng  developments in the stock
markets  in  many countries.  For  instance, by  the  end  of  1996, over  78  developing
countries have stock markets and their capitalization has increased over then-fold over the
past  decade.  Also, the number of domestic companies listed has more  than doubled.
Derivatives  exchanges have played  a  major  role  in  these  developments.  They  have
contributed to more balanced allocation of resources, transfer of risk among agents in a
country, and even contain risks across countries.  Although there are concerns about the
explosive growth of derivatives and the risks that they may create, it appears that these
exchanges are increasing their business. The global derivatives market continues to grow
with emphasis on the introduction of new products.
Derivatives  markets  facilitate the  transfer of  risk  among economic  agents  by
offering  mechanisms  for  liquidity  and  price  discovery.  This  function  is  performed
efficiently with proper institutional arrangements and a suitable exchange microstructure.
Current research supports the proposition that the core functions in the financial system
are the same across time and place, but the institutional arrangements through which these
functions are  performed are  not  (Merton  and Bodie  (1995)).  Core  functions in  the
financial system include clearing and settling payments, pooling resources and providinAg
shares to facilitate diversification, transferring resources across time and space, managing
uncertainty  and  controlling  risk,  providing information  for  pricing  instruments  and
contracts, and dealing with asymmetric information and agency problems.  The functional
approach advocates that the institutional form follows functioni.  We apply this conceptual
finding at the micro-level for the case of derivatives exchange architecture.
We seek to identify commonalities of organizational infrastLucture  for derivatives
exchanges across countries.  Our research is not theoretical. We do not search for models
to determine the structure of derivatives exchange as a part of the capital market system in
an economy.  Nor we are interested in addressing the question of an optimal
organizational arrangements which should be provided prior to establishing a derivatives
market.  The issues of derivatives exchange architecture are important for many of the .
current policy debates regarding the organization of financial markets. However, we want
to provide factual information about elements of exchange microstLucture. We address
the following questions: How do derivatives exchanges emerge and evolve? What is the
24spectrum of products offered by these exchanges? What is the typical sequencing of
products introduced in an exchange? What kind of settlement procedures used in a
derivatives exchange? How similar are market-making activities of derivatives exchanges?
Are there differences in the microstructure of derivatives exchanges? These questions are
particularly interesting in the context of the emerging country economies.
It is in this spirit that the study provides factual information about parameters of
market architecture of derivatives exchanges. Analysis of a survey instrument of 42
derivatives exchanges reveals that the median number of years an exchange has been in
operation is 14 years, with almost 23 percent of the exchanges established after 1990.
There is no predominate form of ownership for the derivatives exchanges, although most
of them are regulated directly or indirectly through the government via a parliamentary
law.  The most frequently cited market-making system is based on an open outcry, daily
mark-to-market with a gross margining. However, electronic systems are also frequently
used either solely or together with mainly an open outcry system. More recently
established derivatives exchanges choose electronic trading systems. Only 30 percent of
the exchanges organize their clearing facilities through an independently organized entity
separately from the exchange.  Almost 45 percent of the survey participants indicated that
they maintain ownership of clearing facilities while a large percentage of clearing houses
maintain multiple ownership. Most of the exchanges use netting in the settlement
procedures. We assess the country environment within which derivatives exchanges
operate and find no significant differences in proxies of economic conditions between
emerging and developed country derivatives. We find, however that  proxies for capital
market conditions somewhat explain differences between developed and emerging
countries, but these differences may be explained by the larger size of capital markets in
developed countries.  Thus, our analysis does not provide conclusive evidence of the
degree of market readiness for the development of a derivatives exchanges and more
research is required in this area.  Overall the empirical evidence supports the proposition
that core functions of a derivatives exchanges while the same across markets are fulfilled
with different institutional arrangements.
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Survey  Distibution
#  Index  Exchanae Name
1 AMEX  AMERICAN  STOCK EXCHANGE
2  ATA  AGRICULTURAL  FUTURES  MARKET AMSTERDAiI (ATA)
3 OTOB  AUSTRIAN FUTURES  AND OPTIONS  EXCHANGE (OTOB)
4 BELFOX  BELFOX C.V./S.C.
5 BOLSA  BOLSA DE MERCADORIAS  & FUTUROS
6 BUDAPEST  BUDAPEST  COMMODITY  EXCHANGE
7 BUDASTOC  BUDAPEST STOCK EXCHANGE
8 CBOE  CHICAGO BOARD OPTIONS  EXCHANGE
9 CBOT  CHICAGO BOARD OF  TRADE
10 CME  CHICAGO MERCANTILE  EXCHANGE
11 CSCE  COFFEE, SUGAR & COCOA EXCHANGE,  INC.
12 DTB  DTB DEUTSCHE  TERMINBORSE
13 EGE  EUROPEAN  OPTIONS  EXCHANGE
14 FCM  FC&M,  CITRUS FRUIT AND  COMMODITY  FUTURES  MARKET  OF VALENCIA
15 FINNISH  FINNISH  OPTIONS MARKET  (FOM) EXCHANGE AND CLEARING HOUSE
i6  FUTOP  FUTOP  MARKET - COPENHAGEN  STOCK EXCHANGE
17 HONGKONG  HONG KONG FUTURES  EXCHANGE LIMITED
18 IFOX  IRISH FUTURES  AND OPTIONS  EXCHANGE
19 IPE  INTERNATIONAL  PETROLEUM  EXCHANGE
20 ITALIAN  ITALIAN STOCK EXCHANGE COUNCIL  ITALIAN DEiRIVATIVES  MARKET
21 KANMCN  KANMON  COMMODITY  EXCHANGE
22 KANSAI  KANSAI AGRICULTURAL  COMMODITIES  EXCHANGE (KANEX)
23 KCBT  KANSAS CITY BOARD  OF TRADE
24 KOBERUB  KOBE RUBBER EXCHANGE (KRE)
25 KOBESILK  KOBE RAW SILK EXCHANGE
26 KUALA  KUALA LUMPUR COMMODITY  EXCHANGE
27 LCE  LONDON COMMODITY  EXCHANGE (LCE)
28 LIFFE  LONDON INTERNATIONAL  FINANCIAL  FUTURES AND  OPTIONS EXCHANGE
29 LME  THE LONDON METAL  EXCHANGE LIMITED
30 MAEBASHI  MAEBASHI DRIED COCOON  EXCHANGE
31 MANILA  MANILA INTERNATIONAL  FUTURES  EXCHANGE, INC.
32 MATIF  MATIF
33 MEFF  MEFF RENTA  FIJA (RF), S.A
34 MERCATO  MERCATO ITALIANO  FUTURES (Comitato  di Gestione MIF)
35 MERFOX  MERCADO DE FUTUROS  Y OPCIONES  S.A.
36 MGE  MINNEAPOLIS  GRAIN EXCHANGE
37 MIDAM  MIDAMERICA  COMMODITY  EXCHANGE
38 MONEP  MARCHE  DES OPTIONS  NEGOCIABLES DE PARIS (MONEP)
39 MONTREAL  THE MONTREAL  EXCHANGE
40 NAGOYA  NAGOYA TEXTILE EXCHANGE
41 NYCE  NEW YORK COTTON  EXCHANGE
42 NYFE  NEW YORK FUTURES EXCHANGE
43 NYMEX  NEW YORK MERCANTILE  EXCHANGE
44 NZFE  NEW ZEALAND FUTURES  & OPTIONS EXCHANGE  LIMITED
45 OMLX  OMLX, THE LONDON  SECURITIES  AND DERIVATIVES  EXCHANGE
46 OSLO  OSLO STOCK EXCHANGE
47 STOCKHO  OM STOCKHOLM
48 OSAKASEC  OSAKA SECURITIES EXCHANGE
49 OSAKATEX  OSAKA TEXTILE EXCHANGE
50 PBOT  PHILADELPHIA BOARD  OF TRADE
51 PSE  PHILADELPHIA STOCK  EXCHANGE
52 RIO  RIO DE JANEIRO STOCK EXCHANGE
53 ROSARIO  ROSARIO FUTURES  EXCHANGE (ROFEX)
54 SAFEX  THE SOUTH  AFRICAN FUTURES  EXCHANGE (SAFEX)
55 SIMEX  SINGAPORE  INTERNATIONAL  MONETARY  EXCHANGE LIMITED
56 SOFFEX  SWISS OPTIONS  AND FINANCIAL  FUTURES EXCHANGE  AG (SOFFEX)
57 SYDNEY  SYDNEY  FUTURES EXCHANGE
58 TELAVIV  THE TEL-AVIV STOCK EXCHANGE, LTD.
59 TIFFE  THE TOKYO INTERNATIONAL  FINANCIAL  FUTURES  EXCHANGE
60 TOKYOCOM  THE TOKYO  COMMODITY  EXCHANGE
61 TOKYOGRA  TOKYO  GRAIN EXCHANGE
62 TOKYOSTO  TOKYO  STOCK EXCHANGE
63 TORONTO  TORONTO FUTURES  EXCHANGE
64 TOYOHASH  TOYOHASHI DRIED  COCOON  EXCHANGE
65 VANCOUVER  VANCOUVER STOCK EXCHANGE
66 WINNIPEG  THE WINNIPEG COMMODITY  EXCHANGE
67 ASED  AUSTRALIAN  STOCK EXCHANGE  DERIVATIVES
68 BEIJING  BEIJING COMMODITY  EXCHANGE
69 KLOFFE  THE KUALA LUMPUR  OPTIONS  & FINANCIAL  FUTURES EXCHANGE BHD
70 SICOM  SINGAPORE  COMMODITY  EXCHANGE (SICOM)
71 ASED  AUSTRALIAN  STOCK EXCHANGE DERIVATIVES
72 BEIJING  BEIJING COMMODITY  EXCHANGE
73 KLOFFE  THE KUALA LUMPUR  OPTIONS  & FINANCIAL FUTURES  EXCHANGE BHD
74 SICOM  SINGAPORE COMMODITY  EXCHANGE (SICOM)
75 SFE  SYDNEY FUTURES  EXCHANGE
page 26TAKLE  2
Responses  to the Survey  Questionnaire
PANEL  A: Responses
# index  Exchange Name
I AMhEX  AMERICAN STOCK  EXCHANGE
2 ATA  AGRICULTURAL  FUTURES  MARKET  AMSTERDAM  (ATA)
3 BELFOX  BELFOXC.V./S.C.
4  BOLSA  BOLSA DE MERCADORtAS  & FUTUROS
5 BUDAPEST  BUDAPEST  COMMOOITY  EXCHANGE
6 BUDASTOC  BUDAPEST STOCK  EXCHANGE
7 CBOE  CHICAGO BOARD  OPTIONS  EXCHANGE
8 CBOT  CHICAGO BOARD  OF TRADE
9 CME  CHICAGO MERCANTILE  EXCHANGE
10  CSCE  COFFEE, SUGAR & COCOA EXCHANGE,  INC.
11  DTB  DTB DEUTSCHE  TERMINBORSE
12  FCM  FC&M, CITRUS  FRUIT AND  COMMODITY  FUTURES  MARKET  OF VALENCIA
13 FUTOP  FUTOP MARKET -COPENHAGEN  STOCK EXCHANGE
14  HONGKCNG  HONG KONG  FUTURES  EXCHANGE LIMITED
15 IPE  INTERNATIONAL  PETROLEUM  EXCHANGE
16  KANSAI  KANSAI  AGRICULTURAL  COMMODITIES  EXCHANGE (KANEX)
17  KCBT  KANSAS CITY BOARD  OF TRADE
18 KOBERUB  KOBE RUBBER EXCHANGE  (KRE)
19  KUALA  KUALA LUMPUR  COMMODITY  EXCHANGE
20 LCE  LONDON COMMODITY  EXCHANGE  (LCE)
21 LIFFE  LONDON INTERNATIONAL  FINANCIAL  FUTURES  AND OPTIONS  EXCHANGE
22 MANILA  MANILA INTERNATIONAL  FUTURES  EXCHANGE, INC
23 MATIF  MATiF
24 MEFF  MEFF RENTA  FIJA (RF), S.A
25 MGE  MINNEAPOLIS  GRAIN EXCHANGE
26 MONEP  MARCHE  DES OPTIONS  NEGOCIABLES  DE PARIS (MONEP)
27 MONTREAL  THE MONTREAL  EXCHANGE
28 NYCE  NEW YORK COTTON  EXCHANGE
29 NYMEX  NEW YORK MERCANTILE  EXCHANGE
30 NZFE  NEW ZEALAND FUTURES  & OPTIONS  EXCHANGE LIMITED
31 OMLX  OMLX, THE LONDON SECURITIES  AND DERIVATIVES  EXCHANGE
32 OSLO  OSLO STOCK EXCHANGE
33 STOCKr_  OM  STOCKHOLM
34 SAFEX  THE SOUTH  AFRICAN FUTURES  EXCHANGE (SAFEX)
35 SIMEX  S1NGAPORE  INTERNATIONAL  MONETARY  EXCHANGE  LIMITED
36 SOFFEX  SWISS OPTIONS  AND FINANCIAL  FUTURES EXCHANGE  AG (SOFFEX)
37 SYDNEY  SYDNEY FUTURES  EXCHANGE
38 TIFFE  THE TOKYO  INTERNATIONAL  FINANCIAL FUTURES  EXCHANGE
39 TOKYOCoM  THE TOKYO  COMMODITY  EXCHANGE
40 WINNIPEG  THE WINNIPEG COMMODITY  EXCHANGE
41  BEIJING  BEIJING COMMODITY  EXCHANGE
42 KLOFFE  THE KUALA  LUMPUR  OPTIONS  & FINANCIAL  FUTURES  EXCHANGE 8HD
Total number  od  responses: 42
Response  rate: 56%
pe e27PANEL  B: Frequency  Distribution  of Responses  by Country::,:  '
Cumulative  Cumulative
COUNTRY  Frequency  Percent  Frequency  Percent
Argentina  1  2.4  1  2.4
Australia  1  2.4  2  4.8
Belgium  1  2.4  3  7.1
Brazil  1  2.4  4  9.5
Canada  2  4.8  6  14.3
China  1  2.4  7  16.7
Denmark  1  2.4  8  19.0
England  4  9.5  12  28.6
France  2  4.8  14  33.3
Hong  Kong  1  2.4  15  35.7
Hungary  2  4.8  17  40.5
Japan  4  9.5  21  50.0
Malaysia  2  4.8  23  54.8
Netherlands  1  2.4  24  57.1
New  Zealand  1  2.4  25  59.5
Norway  1  2.4  26  61.9
Singapore  1  2.4  27  64.3
South  Africa  1  2.4  28  66.7
Spain  2  4.8  30  71.4
Sweden  1  2.4  31  73.8
Switzerland  1  2.4  32  76.2
USA  10  23.8  42  100.0
"PANEL  C:iResponses  from Exchanges  in Emerging  and Developed Markets
Cumulative  Cumulative
CLASSI  FICATION  Frequency  Percent  Frequency  Percent
Developed  34  81  34  81
Emerging  8  19  42  100
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Chronology of Contract introduction
YEAR CONTRACT  EXCHANGE  COUNTRY
1859 Agriculture:  Grains,  Food  and Fiber  Chicago  Board  of Trade  U.S.
1878 Non-Precious  Metals  The London  Metal  Exchange  Limited  England
1933 Precious  Metals  COMEX  Division,  New  York  Mercantile  Exchange  U.S.
1957 Agriculture:  Meat  and  Livestock  Chicago  Mercantile  Exchange  U.S.
1968 Currencies  Chicago  Mercantile  Exchange  (International  Monetary  Market  Division)  U.S.
1971 Interest Rate  Chicago  Mercantile  Exchange  (International  Monetary  Market  Division)  U.S.
1973 Equities  Chicago  Board  Options  Exchange  U.S.
1974 Energy  NYMEX  Division,  New  York Mercantile  Exchange  U.S.
1978 Index  Chicago  Mercantile  Exchange  (Index  and  Option  Market  Division)  U.S.
1989 Swaps  Bolsa  de Mercadorias  & Futuros  Brazil
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Panel A:  All Markets
Contracts  Introduqed  first In the market
CONTRACT  Frequency  Percent
Agriculture:  Grains, Food and Fiber  24  30.4
Agriculture:  Meat and Livestock  1  1.3
Currencies  9  11.4
Energy  1  1.3
Equites  6  7.6
Index  19  24.1
Interest Rate  9  11.4
Non-Precious  Metals  2  2.5
Precious Metals  8  10.1
Contracts  Introduced  second  In the market
CONTRACT  Frequency  Percent
Agriculture:  Meat and Livestock  4  9.5
Currencies  5  1  1.9
Energy  1  2.4
Equities  4  9.5
Index  12  28.6
Interest Rate  12  28.6
Non-Precious  Metals  1  2.4
Precious Metals  3  7.1
Contracts Introduced  third In the market
CONTRACT  Frequency  Percent
Agriculture:  Grains, Food and Fiber  2  10.0
Currencies  3  15.0
Energy  2  10.0
Equities  3'  15.0
Index  4  20.0
Interest Rate  5  25.0
Precious Metals  1  5.0
Contracts Introduced fourth  In the market
CONTRACT  Frequency  Percent
Agriculture:  Grains, Food and Fiber  1  8.3
Currencies  1  8.3
Energy  1  8.3
Equities  2  16.7
Index  2  16.7
Interest Rate  3  25.0
Precious  Metals  2  16.7
Contracts introduced fifth  In the market
CONTRACT  Frequency  Percent
Agriculture:  Meat and Livestock  1  16.7
Currencies  3  50.0
Interest Rate  2  33.3
Contracts  Introduced  sixth In the market
CONTRACT  Frequency  Percent
Agriculture:  Meat and Livestock  1  16.7
Currencies  3  50.0
Interest Rate  2  33.3
Contracts Introduced seventh In the market
CONTRACT  Frequency  Percent
Swaps  1  100.0
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Contracts introduced first in the market
CONTRACT  Frequency  Percent
Agriculture: Grains, Food and Fiber  18  36.0
Agriculture: Meat and Livestock  1  2.0
Currencies  5  10.0
Energy  1  2.0
Equities  4  8.0
Index  11  22.0
Interest  Rate  3  6.0
Non-Precious Metals  2  4.0
Precious Metals  5  10.0
Contracts introduced second in the market
CONTRACT  Frequency  Percent
Agriculture: Meat and Livestock  2  7.4
Currencies  2  7.4
Energy  1  3.7
Equities  4  14.8
Index  8  29.6
Interest  Rate  8  29.6
Precious Metals  2  7.4
Contracts introduced third in the market
CONTRACT  Frequency  Percent
Agriculture: Grains, Food and Fiber  1  10.0
Energy  1  10.0
Equities  1  10.0
Index  3  30.0
Interest  Rate  3  30.0
Precious Metals  1  10.0
Contracts introduced fourth in the market
CONTRACT  Frequency  Percent
Currencies  1  20.0
Energy  1  20.0
Equities  1  20.0
Index  1  20.0
Interest  Rate  1  20.0
Contracts introduced fifth in the market
CONTRACT  Frequency  Percent
Currencies  1  100.0
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Contracts introduced first  in the market
CONTRACT  Frequency  Percent
Agriculture:  Grains,  Food and Fiber  6  20.7
Currencies  4  13.8
Equities  2  6.9
Index  8  27.6
Interest Rate  6  20.7
Precious  Metals  3  10.3
Contracts introduced second in the market
CONTRACT  Frequency  Percent
Agriculture:  Meat  and Livestock  2  13.3
Currencies  3  20.0
Index  4  26.7
Interest Rate  4  26.7
Non-Precious  Metals  1  6.7
Precious  Metals  1  6.7
Contracts introduced third in the market
CONTRACT  Frequency  Percent
Agriculture:  Grains,  Food and  Fiber  1  10.0
Currencies  3  30.0
Energy  1  10.0
Equities  2  20.0
Index  1  10.0
Interest Rate  2  20.0
Contracts introduced fourth in the market
CONTRACT  Frequency  Percent
Agriculture:  Grains,  Food  and Fiber  1.  14.3
Equities  1  14.3
Index  1  14.3
Interest Rate  2  28.6
Precious  Metals  2  28.6
Contracts introduced fifth  in the market
CONTRACT  Frequency  Percent
Agriculture:  Meat  and Livestock  1  20.0
Currencies  2  40.0
Interest Rate  2  40.0
Contracts introduced sixth in the market
CONTRACT  Frequency  Percent
Swaps  1  100.0
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TIME  ELAPSED  BETWEEN  SUCCESSIVE  CONTRACT INTRODUCTIONS
(Months)
Time elapsed  from:  N  Median  Mode  STD  SKEWNESS  KURTOSIS
First to second contract  44  36  24  349.486  2.7231  6.2710
Second to third contract  26  18  12  131.618  4.0283  18.1031
Third to fourth contract  11  48  12  58.251  1.2239  0.5101
Fourth to fifth contract  6  24  24  16.971  0.0000  -0.3000
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Age of Derivative  Exchanges
:i--::PANEL  A: Years  in Operation of Derivative Exchanges
#  Index  Exchange  Date  Exchange  Country
established
1  OSLO  OSLO  STOCK  EXCHANGE  1819  Norway
2  CBOT  CHICAGO  BOARD  OF TRADE  1848  US
3  KCBT  KANSAS  CITY BOARD  OF TRADE  1856  US
4  NYCE  NEWYORKCOTTON EXCHANGE  1870  US
5  NYMEX  NEWYORK MERCANTILE  EXCHANGE  1872  US
6  MONTREAL  THE  MONTREAL  EXCHANGE  1874  Canada
7  MGE  MINNEAPOLIS  GRAIN EXCHANGE  1905  US
8  CSCE  COFFEE,  SUGAR  & COCOA  EXCHANGE.  INC.  1882  US
9  WINNIPEG  THE WINNIPEG  COMMODITY  EXCHANGE  1887  Canada
10  CME  CHICAGO  MERCANTILE  EXCHANGE  1898  US
11  ATA  AGRICULTURAL  FUTURES  MARKET  AMSTERDAM  (ATA)  1905  Holland
12  AMEX  AMERICAN  STOCK  EXCHANGE  1908  US
13  KOBERUB  KOBE  RUBBER  EXCHANGE  (KRE)  1951  Japan
14  LCE  LONDON  COMMODITY  EXCHANGE  (LCE)  1954  GB
15  SYDNEY  SYDNEY  FUTURES  EXCHANGE  1960  Australia
16  CBOE  CHICAGO  BOARD  OPTIONS  EXCHANGE  1972  US
17  HONGKONG  HONG  KONG  FUTURES  EXCHANGE  LIMITED  1976  Hong  Kong
18  IPE  INTERNATIONAL  PETROLEUM  EXCHANGE  1980  GB
19  KUALA-KLCE  KUALA  LUMPUR  COMMODITY  EXCHANGE  1980  Malaysia
20  LIFFE  LONDON  INTERNATIONAL  FINANCIAL  FUTURES  AND  OPTIONS  EXCHANGE  1982  GB
21  SIMEX  SINGAPORE  INTERNATIONAL  MONETARY  EXCHANGE  LIMITED  1983  Singapore
22  TOKYOCOM  THE TOKYO  COMMODITY  EXCHANGE  1984  Japan
23  NZFE  NEW  ZEALAND  FUTURES  & OPTIONS  EXCHANGE  LIMITED  1985  New  Zealand
24  STOCKHO  OM STOCKHOLM  1985  Sweden
25  MATIF  MATIF  1986  France
26  SOFFEX  SWiSS OPTiONS  AND FiNANCIAL  FU  T URES  EXCHANGE  AG (SOFFEX)  i986  Switzerland
27  MONEP  MARCHE  DES  OPTIONS  NEGOCIABLES  DE PARIS  (MONEP)  1987  France
28  BUDAPEST  BUDAPEST  COMMODITY  EXCHANGE  1989  Hungary
29  TIFFE  THE TOKYO  INTERNATIONAL  FINANCIAL  FUTURES  EXCHANGE  1989  Japan
30  OMLX  OMLX,  THE LONDON  SECURITIES  AND DERIVATIVES  EXCHANGE  1989  GB
31  SAFEX  THE SOUTH  AFRICAN  FUTURES  EXCHANGE  (SAFEX)  1990  South Africa
32  BUDASTOC  BUDAPEST  STOCK EXCHANGE  1990  Hungary
33  BELFOX  BELFOX  C.V./S.C.  1991  Belgium
34  MEFF  MEFF  RENTA  1991  Spain
35  BEIJING  BEIJING  COMMODITY  EXCHANGE  1993  China
36  KANSAI  KANSAI  AGRICULTURAL  COMMODITIES  EXCHANGE  (KANEX)  1993  Japan
37  FCM  FC&M,  CITRUS  FRUIT  AND  COMMODITY  FUTURES  MARKET  OF VALENCIA  1995  Spain
38  KLOFFE  THE KUALA  LUMPUR  OPTIONS  & FINANCIAL  FUTURES  EXCHANGE  BHD  1995  Malaysia
39  FUTOP  FUTOP  MARKET  -COPENHAGEN  STOCK  EXCHANGE  1996  Denmark
Median  Years  in Operation: 14  years
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:  PANELB:  Ruceniy  -stab'is-e-  Derivatives  Exchanges
Date Exchange  Years in
No, Index  Exchange  established  Country  Operation
1  SAFEX  THE SOUTH  AFRICAN FUTURES  EXCHANGE  (SAFEX)  1990  South Africa  6
2  BUDASTOC  BUDAPEST  STOCK EXCHANGE  1990  Hungary  6
3  BELFOX  BELFOX  C.V./S.C.  1991  Belgium  5
4  MEFF  MEFF  RENTA  1991  Spain  5
5  BEIJING  BEIJING  COMMODITY  EXCHANGE  1993  China  3
6  KANSAI  KANSAI  AGRICULTURAL  COMMODITIES  EXCHANGE  (KANEX)  1993  Japan  3
7  FCM  FC&M, CITRUS  FRUIT  AND COMMODITY  FUTURES  MARKET  OF VALENCIA  1995  Spain  1
8  KLOFFE  THE KUALA LUMPUR  OPTIONS  & FINANCIAL  FUTURES  EXCHANGE  BHD  1995  Malaysia  1
9  FUTOP  FUTOP MARKET  - COPENHAGEN  STOCK EXCHANGE  1996  Denmark  0
Recently  established  derivatives  exchanges  as a percentage  of total exhanges  in survey: 23.1%
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Ownership  Fotm of Delvatves Exchanges
I  OSLO  0SLOSTOCKENCHINE  -
2  NVCE  NWYOK  COTTNECN HANGEl_d
4  MONI1MA.  TME  MONIAREAL  EXCOWIGE  GttSogi  CCI*C
7  -GE  mcesOL GRFMI  SXC  E  H
I  0a  CHICAGO  MRCANITLE  EXO*JE  ti
ANX  A9N  STOCK  EKCAGf  A
I  KooEIUS  KOESSSEREXO4ANGE
IS  SYWNEY  SYDNEVPUTLNSES  EXCHANGEbOlCOlf to  cnwe  sffw  rm  co  I#  n  ca_
t1  BUAEBT  BuaZps  CCAOIDITf  E  a!  -
12  TPFE  THE  TOKOM TSMTIONAlBML  FUTAtlESCNE  CHh  tu
i1  SIATOC  UDAPESTSTOOCSKXCoAE
14  BEING  UEL10  COMMOITY  CXCH SE
I  NEE  NEW  ZEALARN  FUTUES A OPTION EXCHANGE  LIMED  Oin%w*  Scw  O
2  SOFFEK  SWISS  OPTIONS  hit  AL  UT  50*406  AO  (SOFS  6
3  MONEP  MARCH DES  OPTIONS  NSGOCAS  - PAFtE  QONEP)  o  lS  F_c.  UI
I  KCDT  KANSAS  CITY OARD  OF  TRADE  bn
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Regulatory Status of Derivative Exchanges
Panel  A: Parliamentary  Regulation  via a law & Government  via Ministry
i  Index  Exchange  Name
1  BUDAPEST  BUDAPEST  COMMODITY  EXCHANGE
2  BUDASTOC  BUDAPEST  STOCK  EXCHANGE
3  CBOE  CHICAGO  BOARD OPTIONS EXCHANGE
4  FUTOP  FUTOP MARKET  -COPENHAGEN  STOCK  EXCHANGE
5  MONEP  MARCHE  DES OPTIONS  NEGOCIABLES  DE PARIS  (MONEP)
6  SAFEX  THE  SOUTH AFRICAN  FUTURES EXCHANGE  (SAFEX)
7  SYDNEY  SYDNEY  FUTURES EXCHANGE
Panel  B: Government  Regulation  via governmcnt  committte
I  Lndeb  Exchann  gName
I  KCBT  KANSAS CITY  BOARD OF TRADE
2  NYMEX  NEWYORK MERCANTILE  EXCHANGE
3  CSCE  COFFEE. SUGAR  & COCOA EXCHANGE,  INC.
4  ATA  AGRICULTURAL  FUTURES  MARKET  AMSTERDAM  (ATA)
5  IPE  INTERNATIONAL  PETROLEUM  EXCHANGE
6  TIFFE  THE TOKYO INTERNATIONAL  FINANCIAL  FUTURES  EXCHANGE
Panel  C:  Government  Regulation  via  Ministry
#  Index  Exchange  Name
t  NYCE  NEW YORK COTTON EXCHANGE
2  CME  CHICAGO  MERCANTILE  EXCHANGE
3  KUALA-KLCE  KUALA  LUMPUR  COMMODITY  EXCHANGE
4  SIMEX  SINGAPORE  INTERNATIONAL  MONETARY  EXCHANGE  LIMITED
5  TOKYOCOM  THE TOKYO  COMMODITY  EXCHANGE
6  STOCKHO  OM STOCKHOLM
7  BELFOX  BELFOX  C.V./S.C.
8  MEFF  MEFF RENTA
9  KANSAJ  KANSAI  AGRICULTURAL  COMMODITIES  EXCHANGE  (KANEX)
10  FCM  FC&M,  CITRUS FRUIT  AND  COMMODITY  FUTURES  MARKET  OF VALENCIA
11  KLOFFE  THE KUALA  LUMPUR  OPTIONS & FINANCIAL  FUTURES  EXCHANGE  BHD
Panel  D:  Self  Regulated  Exchanges
7  Index.  Exchange  Name
1  OSLO  OSLO STOCK  EXCHANGE
2  MONTREAL  THE MONTREAL  EXCHANGE
3  MGE  MINNEAPOLIS  GRAIN EXCHANGE
4  WINNIPEG  THE WINNIPEG  COMMODITY  EXCHANGE
5  AMEX  AMERICAN  STOCK  EXCHANGE
6  KODERUB  KOBE  RUBBER  EXCHANGE  (KRE)
7  I-IFFE  LONDON  INTERNATIONAL  FINANCIAL  FUTURES  AND  OPTIONS  EXCHANGE
8  NZFE  NEW  ZEALAND  FUTURES  & OPTIONS  EXCHANGE  LIMITED
9  MATIF  MATIF
10  SOFFEX  SWISS OPTIONS  AND FINANCIAL  FUTURES  EXCHANGE  AG (SOFFEX)
11  BEIING  BEIJING  COMMODITY  EXCHANGE
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Market  Making  System
!  hdel  Exchange7
1 KC8T  KANSAS  CITY  BOARD  OF TRADE  Open  outcry
2 NYCE  NEW YORK  COTTON  EXCHANGE  Open  outcry
3 MGE  MINNEAPOLIS  GRAIN  EXCHANGE  Open  outcry
4 WINNIPEG  THE WINNIPEG  COMMODITY  EXCHANGE  Open  outcry
5 ATA  AGRICULTURAL  FUTURES  MARKET  AMSTERDAM  (ATA)  Open  outcry
6 IPE  INTERNATIONAL  PETROLEUM  EXCHANGE  Open  outcry
7 CSCE  COFFEE,  SUGAR  & COCOA  EXCHANGE.  INC.  Open  outcry  & Market  maker  system
8 CBOE  CHICAGO  BOARD  OPTIONS  EXCHANGE  Open  outcry  & Market  maker  system
9 CBOT  CHICAGO  BOARD  OF TRADE  Open  outcry & Electronic  screen  based  system
10 NYMEX  NEW YORK  MERCANTILE  EXCHANGE  Open  outcry  method  & Electronic  screen  based  system
11  LCE  LONDON  COMMODITY  EXCHANGE  (LCE)  Open  outcry  method  & Electronic  screen  based  system
1Z  SOFFEX  SWISS  OPTIONS  AND  FINANCIALI  FIJTURES  EXCI-IANGEAG  (SOFFEX)  ElcitronIc  screen  based  system
t3 SAFEX  THE  SOUTH  AFRICAN  FUlURlES  EXCIlANGE  (SAFtEX)  Elbecounic  screen  based  system
14 BELFOX  BELFOXC,VIS.C.  Elocirorric  screen  based  system
15 U3EIJING  BEIJING  COMMODITY  EXCHANGE  Electronic  screen  based  system
16 FUTOP  FUTOP  MARKET  - COPENHAGEN  STOCK  EXCHANGE  Electronic  screen  based  system
17 STOCKHO  OM STOCKHOLM  Electronic  screen  based  system,  based  on  "ClicKe  trading  system
18 OMLX  OMLX,  THE  LONDON  SECURITIES  AND  DERIVATIVES  EXCHANGE  Electronic  screen  based  system,  based  on  "ClicK'  trading  system
19 CME  CHICAGO  MERCANTILE  EXCHANGE  'Open  outcry,  daily mark  to market,  gross  margining
20 KOBERUB  KOBE  RUBBER  EXCHANGE  (KRE)  'Open  outcry,  daily  mark  to market,  gross  margining
21 SYDNEY  SYDNEY  FUTURES  EXCHANGE  'Open  outcry,  daily  mark  to market,  gross margining
22 KUALA-KLCE  KUALA  LUMPUR  COMMODITY  EXCHANGE  'Open  outcry,  daily mark  to market,  gross  margining
23 SIMEX  SINGAPORE  INTERNATIONAL  MONETARY  EXCHANGE  LIMITED  Open  outcry,  daily  mark  to  market,  gross  margining
24 BUDASTOC  BUDAPEST  STOCK  EXCHANGE  'Open  outcry,  daily mark  to  market,  gross  margining
25 LIFFE  LONDON  INTERNATIONAL  FINANCIAL  FUTURES  AND  OPTIONS  EXCHANGE  Open  outcry  method,  Market  maker  system  & Electronic  screen  based  system
28 MONEP  MARCHE  DES  OPTIONS  NEGOCIABLES  DE  PARIS  (MONEP)  Market  maker  system  & Electronic  screen  based  system
27 BUDAPEST  BUDAPEST  COMMODITY  EXCHANGE  Market  maker  system  &  Open  outcry,  daily  mark  to  market,  gross  margining
28 KLOFFE  THE KUALA  LUMPUR  OPTIONS  & FINANCIAL  FUTURES  EXCHANGE  BHD  Market  maker  system  for  options  & Electronic  screen  based  system
29 HONGKONG  HONG  KONG  FUTURES  EXCHANGE  LIMITED  Market  maker  system  & Electronic  screen  based  system,  based  on  "Click"  trading  system
30 MONTREAL  THE MONTREAL  EXCHANGE  Market  maker  system  &  open  outcry,  mark  to market,  gross  margins
31 FCM  FC&M,  CITRUS  FRUIT  AND COMMODITY  FUTURES  MARKET  OF  VALENCIA  Integrated  regestration  real  bme  margining  and  clearing  system
32 MEFF  MEFF  RENTA  Electronic  screen  based  system  with daily  mark  to market  ard  gross  margining
33 TIFFE  THE TOKYO  INTERNATIONAL  FINANCIAL  FUTURES  EXCHANGE  Electronic  screen  based  system  based  on "ClicKl  trading  system
34 KANSAI  KANSAI  AGRICULTURAL  COMMODITIES  EXCHANCGE  (KANEX)  Electronic  screern  based  system  based  on "Click'  irading  system  ior opuons  & daily  mark-to-market,  gross  margining
35 OSLO  OSLO  STOCK  EXCHANGE  Electronic  screen  based  system  with broadcast  for Market  Makers  & telephone  based  trading
36 MATIF  MATIF  Electronic  screen  based  system  & Open  outcry,  daily mark  to market,gross  margining
37 AMEX  AMERICAN  STOCK  EXCHANGE  Specialist  -Auction  Market
38 TOKYOCOM  THE  TOKYO  COMMODITY  EXCHANGE  N/A
39 NZFE  NEW ZEALAND  FUTURES  &  OPTIONS  EXCHANGE  LIMITED  N/A
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Ownership Structure  of the Clearing House
PANEL  A  Deri ati es E changes  with in house clearing houses
#  Index  Exchange Name
1  CBOT  CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE
2  KCBT  KANSAS CITY BOARD OF TRADE
3  NYMEX  NEW YORK MERCANTILE  EXCHANGE
4  MGE  MINNEAPOLIS GRAIN EXCHANGE
5  CSCE  COFFEE, SUGAR & COCOA EXCHANGE, iNC.
6  WINNIPEG  THE WINNIPEG COMMODITY  EXCHANGE
7  CME  CHICAGO MERCANTILE  EXCHANGE
8  KOBERUB  KOBE RUBBER EXCHANGE (KRE)
9  LCE  LONDON COMMODITY EXCHANGE (LCE)
10  SYDNEY  SYDNEY FUTURES  EXCHANGE
11  CBOE  CHICAGO BOARD  OPTIONS EXCHANGE
12  HONGKONG HONG KONG FUTURES  EXCHANGE LIMITED
13  SIMEX  SINGAPORE INTERNATIONAL  MONETARY EXCHANGE LIMITED
14  TOKYOCOM THE TOKYO COMMODITY  EXCHANGE
15  STOCKHO  OM STOCKHOLM
16  MATIF  MATIF
17  SOFFEX  SWISS OPTIONS AND FINANCIAL  FUTURES  EXCHANGE AG (SOFFEX)
18  TIFFE  THE TOKYO INTERNATIONAL  FINANCIAL FUTURES  EXCHANGE
19  BELFOX  BELFOX C.V./S.C.
20  MEFF  MEFF RENTA
21  BEIJING  BEIJING COMMODITY  EXCHANGE
22  KANSAI  KANSAI AGRICULTURAL  COMMODITIES  EXCHANGE (KANEX)
23  FCM  FC&M, CITRUS FRUIT  AND COMMODITY FUTURES MARKET OF VALENCIA
24  FUTOP  FUTOP MARKET - COPENHAGEN  STOCK EXCHANGE
page 39PANEL B: Alternative Arrangements for Clearing House  :  i
No  Index  Exchange  Arrangement
1  ATA  AGRICULTURAL  FUTURES  MARKET  AMSTERDAM  Owned  by Banks  and Exchanges
2  BUDAPEST BUDAPEST  COMMODITY  EXCHANGE  Owned  by Banks  and Exchanges
3  BUDASTOC BUDAPEST  STOCK EXCHANGE  Owned  by Banks  and  Exchanges
4  KUALA-KLCEKUALA  LUMPUR  COMMODITY  EXCHANGE  Owned  by Multiple  Institutions
5  OSLO  OSLO  STOCK  EXCHANGE  Owned  by Multiple  Institutions
6  IPE  INTERNATIONAL  PETROLEUM  EXCHANGE  Owned  by Financial  Institutions
7  LIFFE  LONDON  INTERNATIONAL  FINANCIAL  FUTURES  AND  OPTIONS  EXCHANGE  Owned  by Financial  Institutions
8  SAFEX  THE SOUTH  AFRICAN  FUTURES  EXCHANGE  Owned  by Financial  Institutions
9  MONTREAL THE MONTREAL  EXCHANGE  Owned  by other exchanges
10  AMEX  AMERICAN  STOCK  EXCHANGE  Owned  by other exchanges
11  N FE  NEW EALAND  FUTURES  AND  OPTIONS  EXCHANGE  LIMITED  Owned  by other exchanges
12  OMLX  OMLX,  THE LONDON  SECURITIES  AND DERIVATIVES  EXCHANGE  Owned  by other exchanges
13  KLOFFE  THE KUALA  LUMPUR  OPTIONS  & FINANCIAL  FUTURES  EXCHANGE  BHD  Owned  by other exchanges
14  NYCE  NEW YORK  COTTON  EXCHANGE  Owned  by other institutions
15  MONER  MARCHE  DES  OPTIONS  NEGOCIABLES  DE  PARIS  Owned  by other institutions
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Settlement  Procedures
#  Index  Exchange  Name  Procedure
1  WINNIPEG  THE  WINNIPEG  COMMODITY  EXCHANGE  Bilateral  netting
2  BUDAPEST  BUDAPEST  COMMODITY  EXCHANGE  Bilateral  netting
3  BEIJING  BEIJING  COMMODITY  EXCHANGE  Bilateral  netting
4  CBOT  CHICAGO  BOARD  OF TRADE  Netting  by novation
5  LCE  LONDON  COMMODITY  EXCHANGE  (LCE)  Netting  by novation
6  SYDNEY  SYDNEY  FUTURES  EXCHANGE  Netting  by novation
7  IPE  INTERNATIONAL  PETROLEUM  EXCHANGE  Netting  by novation
8  TIFFE  THE  TOKYO  INTERNATIONAL  FINANCIAL  FUTURES  EXCHANGE  Netting  by novation
9  OMLX  OMI.X,  THE  LONDON  SECURITIES  AND  DERIVATIVES  EXCHANGE  Nolting  by novation
10  OSLO  OSLO  STOCK  EXCI  iANGE  Mtitilateral  notting
11  AMEX  AMERICAN  STOCK  EXCHANGE  Mutilatoral  neting
12  MATIF  MATIF  Mutilatoral  netting
13  MONEP  MARCHE  DES  OPTIONS  NEGOCIABLES  DE PARIS  (MONEP)  Mutilateral  notting
14  BUDASTOC  BUDAPEST  STOCK  EXCHANGE  Mutilateral  netting
15  MEFF  MEFFRENTA  Mutilateral  netting
16  KANSAI  KANSAI  AGRICULTURAL  COMMODITIES  EXCHANGE  (KANEX)  Mutilateral  netting
17  HONGKONG HONG  KONG  FUTURES  EXCHANGE  LIMITED  Netting  by novation,  Mutilateral  nefting
18  STOCKHO  OM  STOCKHOLM  Nefting  by novation.  Multilateral  netting
19  CME  CHICAGO  MERCANTILE  EXCHANGE  Firms  are  required  to pay  net variation  due per  origin
20  FUTOP  FUTOP  MARKET  - COPENHAGEN  STOCK  EXCHANGE  Clearing  house  is legal  counterpartner  to all brokers
21  KUALA-KLCE  KUALA  LUMPUR  COMMODITY  EXCHANGE  At maturity:  settlement  by physical  delivery.  Other  seKtlement:  marked  to market
22  LIFFE  LONDON  INTERNATIONAL  FINANCIAL  FUTURES  AND  OPTIONS  EXCHANG Normal  Netting  at  Clearing  House  Level
23  NYMEX  NEW  YORK  MERCANTILE  EXCHANGE  Gross  basis
24  SOFFEX  SWISS  OPTIONS  AND  FINANCIAL  FUTURES  EXCHANGE  AG  (SOFFEX)  Position  neKting  for each  member  nightly
25  KLOFFE  THE KUALA  LUMPUR  OPTIONS  & FINANCIAL  FUTURES  EXCHANGE  BHD  Netting  is allowed  only  within  the same  individual  client  account;
segregation  of accounts  is up to individual  client  level;  gross  margining  applies  after  netting
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